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Summary  findings
Using economic rates of return from more than  1,200  become more productive  when economic policymaking
public and private sector projects implemented in 61  improves.
developing countries, Isham and Kaufmann analyze  The productivity of projects in the tradable sectors are
determinants of investment productivity.  also affected (in a nonlinear fashion) by the size of a
Results from Tobit estinmation  demonstrate  that  country's public investment program.
the degree of countrywide  policy distortions-  Isham and Kaufmann discuss possible selection biases
macroecononmic,  exchange rate,  trade,  and pricing-  in this data set, present tests of robustness, and highlight
critically affects the productivity  of investments.  policy implications. In particular, donor financing for
Countries  with undistorted  policies are likely to end  improvements in the policy climate is likely to pay off. A
up with highlv productive  investments. In countries  powerful rationale for supporting structural reform is
with distorred policies, investilments  are likely to be  that it raises the productivity of both public and private
unproductive.  And within a country,  investments  investments.
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The Productivity  of Investment  Projects
Jonathan  Isham and Daniel KaufmannI. Introduction 1
The last 35 years of developing  country  experience  should  persuade: policies do matter for
economic  growth. Since 1960,  the most successful  economies  have tended to maintain  undistorted  domestic
prices, a stable macroeconomic  framework,  open trade regimes,  and steady investments  in people (World Bank
1991; Sachs  and Warner 1995). While pointing  in one direction,  this experience  leaves plenty  of room for
interpretation--not  to mention  disagreement--among  policy  makers and scholars over the importance  of economic
policies relative to exogenous  variables and institutional  factors (Mauro 1995,  Knack and Keefer 1995), the
evidence  on causality, and the types of economic  policies  that matter most (Summers  and Pritchett 1993).
Theoretical  and empirical  analyses that specify  channels  through  which national policies  may affect long-run
growth rates (e.g., Lucas 1988;  Romer 1986, 1990; Barro 1990, 1991;  King and Rebelo 1990; Mankiw, Romer,
and Weil 1992) are often  contradictory  as well as econometrically  problematic  (Levine and Renelt 1992).
In many ways, this lively  debate on the possible sources  of economic  growth has obscured  one
of the key rationales  for policy reform:  increasing  investment  productivity. Consider  both publicly-  and
privately-financed  investment  projects in the developing  world. Their aggregate  performance,  along with the
performance  of firms, farms, and private  entrepreneurs,  will over  the long-term  determine  a country's  growth
rate. Insofar as project  investment  performance  is a contributor  to economic  growth, the effect of the policy
environment  on project  performance  suggests  the overall importance  of policy  reform.
For some  years, there has been a limited  consensus  that the policy  environment  can affect
project-level  performance  (World Bank 1989). Yet many questions  on this linkage have remained  unanswered.
How important  is the policy  environment  for project-level  success? What type of policy  distortions  are
particularly  important? How does the importance  of policies  compare  to other  factors? Can certain type of
projects  be designed  to be insulated  from policy  distortions? Could other mechanisms  affect both projects and
policies?
I Kaufmann:  Chief  of Resident  Mission,  Kiev,  Ukraine;  The World  Bank,  1818  H Street,  Washington,  DC 20433;
dkaufmann  @worldbank.org.  Isham: Research  Associate;  the IRIS  Center  at the University  of Maryland,  Morrill  Hall,
College  Park,  MD 20742;  isham@econ.uind.edu.  This  research  began  during  the preparation  of The  World  Development
Report  1991. The  authors  benefited  from  comments  and  suggestions  from  many  World  Bank  staff  as well  as seminar
participants  at the National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  MIT,  and  the AEA  annual  meetings.  The  authors  owe  special
thanks  to  Ajay  Chibber,  Angus  Deaton,  Paul  Duane,  Eduardo  Engel,  Stanley  Fischer,  Albert  Fishlow,  Gobind  Nankani,
Manuel  Penalver,  Lant  Pritchett,  Sarath  Rajapatirana,  Dani  Rodrik,  Andre  Schleifer,  Joel  Slemnrod,  Kenneth  Sokoloff,
Larry  Summers,  and  Vinod  Thomas.  In addition,  we  thank  staff  of  the Operations  Evaluation  Departmnent  of the World
Bank  and  the evaluation  unit of  the International  Financial  Corporation  for  their  generosity  with  data  and  advice.In this paper, we use data on economic  rates of return (ERRs) from a set of 1,276  public and
private  investment  projects to try to answer these questions. This unique data set has a number  of advantages. It
has a wide coverage  across countries  and over  time; it was calculated  according  to a relatively  uniform
methodology;  and it measures  productivity  from an economic  standpoint. Most importantly,  by using a
microeconomic  unit of observation  as the dependent  variable, the problems  of spurious causality and
simultaneity  often  faced by the empirical  work in the aggregate  growth literature are greatly reduced. In
addition,  this data provides  insights  on how policies affect  returns to investment  at the micro level--insights  that
are lost in aggregate  statistical  analysis. This data set also has one major  disadvantage:  these  projects are not a
random  (nor necessarily  representative)  sample  of typical investment  projects in developing  countries. This
problem  must be addressed  in the statistical  analysis.
This paper is organized  as follows. Section  Il summarizes  the project  and country-wide  data
used in this analysis and the basic statistical  results. Sections  III and IV present the main econometric results,
and section V addresses sample selection biases.  Section VI presents a set of  proposed mechanisms for the
linkage between the policy enviromnent  and investment productivity. Section VII concludes with a
discussion on project selection in the developing  world.
II. The Data and Basic Results
A.  Project  data.
From the World Bank's Operations  Evaluation  Department  (OED) and the evaluation  unit of
the International  Financial  Corporation  (IFC) , we assembled  a data set of public and private sector projects in
61 developing  countries,  implemented  from the late 1960's into the early 1990's.  The data include  reestimated
economic  rates of return (ERRs)--as  well as other  project specific  information 2--from 1,163  investment  projects
financed  by the Bank and implemented  by public agencies  in developing  countries and from 113  private projects
financed  by the IFC. The analysis in this paper includes  all projects in tradeable sectors--agriculture,  industry,
and tourism--and  non-tradeable  sectors--transport,  infrastructure,  energy,  water, and urban--for which such
ERRs have been calculated  and for which a minimum  set of country-specific  policy indices  was available. 3
2 For  an analysis  on the divergence  between ex-ante and  ex-post ERRs, see Pohl and Mihaljek (1  992).
3 Kaufmann  and  Wang  (1995)  examine  the performance  of social  sector  projects--which  receive  a binary
"satisfactory/unsatisfactory'  rating  from  OED  but  no ERR--as  the dependent  variable  in a Probit  specification.  They  find
that the probability  of project failure in the social sectors  is positively  and significantly  associated with policy  distortion
indicators  such as the fiscal  deficit, the foreign  exchange  parallel market premnium,  and the degree  of price distortions.The reestimated  ERR of each project is measured  via a standard cost-benefit  methodology
(Gittinger 1982; Squire and van der Tak 1975)4,  about two-to-three  years after the completion  of World Bank
funding. According  to this methodology,  the discounted  stream of project  costs and benefits  is evaluated at
shadow  (or border) prices. As such,  the rates of return will likely differ from the financial  rates of return that a
private investor  would  calculate.
B. Policy perfornance data
Policy distortions  indices  were gathered  from independent  sources. 5 The main indices used in
this analysis were:
(a) black market  premia:  the average annual mark-up of the parallel market  rate for foreign  exchange
over the official  exchange  rate;
(b) fiscal deficit of the central government  as a share of GDP,
(c) index of trade restrictiveness,  based upon specific  policy  criteria such as tariffs and non-tariff
barriers;
(d) index of pricing distortions  in tradable goods,  measuring  the deviation  of the domestic  price levels
from international  price equivalencies  for final tradable goods; and
(e) real interest rate.
Quantifying  characteristics  of macroeconomic,  microeconomic  and trade regimes can be a
delicate and inconclusive  exercise (Rodrik 1994,  Pritchett 1993). Separately and together,  however,  these five
indicators  do capture major policy  distortions  in each economy. The black market  premia reflects distortions  in
the trade, pricing, and exchange  rate regime, as well as macroeconomic  instability  and capital account
restrictions;  the fiscal deficit  is an indicator of macroeconomic  instability. Additional  variables  incorporated  into
the investment  productivity analysis--including  years of education,  capital/labor  ratio, terms of trade changes,
and the degree of project  complexity--will  be discussed  below.
4  There  are some  exceptions  to this  general  use of standard  methodology  in project  evaluation.  For example,  World  Bank
and  OED  staff  typically  value  non-traded  output  of an agricultural  project  at economic  prices,  whereas  they  typically  value
non-traded  output of a power project at the utility's regulated tariff rates.
5 See Appendix  2 for  a detailed  description of this data.-4-
Table 1. Economic policies and the economic rate of return (ERR) of projects:
single policy distortions
Average ERR (%
All  Public  of which  Private
projects  projects  projects
agricul-  industry  non-
ture  tradable
.________________________________  __________  __________sectors




Highly  restrictive  13.2  13.6  12.2  insf  14.6  9.5
Somewhat  15.0  15.4  15.4  insf  16.0  10.7
restrictive
Non-restrictive  19.0  19.3  14.3  insf  24.3  17.1
2. Exchange  rate
overvaluation:  black
market Premia:
High (> 200%)  8.2  7.2  3.2  insf  11.5  insf
Medium  (20-200%)  14.4  14.9  11.9  13.7  17.2  10.3
Low (< 20%)  17.7  18.0  16.6  16.6  19.3  15.2
3. Real interest rate
Negative  15.0  15.4  12.7  12.7  17.9  11.0
Positive  17.3  17.5  17.0  17.8  17.9  15.6
4. Fiscal deficit
High C 8%  of GDP)  13.4  13.7  11.7  10.3  16.6  10.7
Medium (4-8%)  14.8  15.1  12.2  21.0  16.8  12.2
Low (<  4%)  17.8  18.1  18.6  14.1  18.2  14.3
5. Price distortion:
index of tradable
High distortions  15.6  15.9  13.1  14.0  18.4  11.0
Low distortions  17.5  17.5  17.0  16.5  18.1  17.2
Notes:  Average  reestimated  economic  rate of return of public  and private  projects,
classified  by single policy  distortion.
'Insf' denotes  insufficient  number  of observations  (less than 10)  to make
inferences.
Source: Authors'  calculations.-5  -
C. Basic statistical analysis
Average ERRs, disaggregated  by sector and type of single policy  distortion,  are presented  in
table 1 6  The differences  between  investnment  efficiency  in undistorted  and a distorted  policy  environments  can
be very large. The (Pearson) correlation  coefficients  between the policy  index and ERRs (not shown) are highly
significant,  with few exceptions. 7
In most cases, when classifying  by a single policy distortion  indicator,  average ERRs of
projects implemented  under a distorted  policy  regime  are at least five percentage  points lower than those of
projects implemented  under an undistorted  regime. 8 In addition,  each of the five policy  distortion  indices appears
to impact significantly  across  sectors--although  to different  degrees. Further,  the sensitivity  of public  sector
projects to policy  distortions  is at least as significant  as for private sector projects.
A country  that mismanages  its exchange  rate is also likely  to exhibit  macroeconomic  instability
as well as trade and pricing  distortions:  it is therefore  relevant to assess the combined  effect of policy distortions
on ERRs. Average ERRs, disaggregated  by various combinations  of policy  distortions,  are presented  in
appendix table 1. Multiple  policy  distortions,  when compared  with an undistorted  policy  environment,  can make
a difference  of over 10 percentage  points. These large differences  between  investment  efficiency  in undistorted
and distorted  environments  (measured  by multiple  indicators)  suggest  an independent  effect of different  types of
distortions 9--a result which is explored  in the econometric  specifications  below.
IV.  The Effect of Economic Policy Distortions on ERRs:  Econometric Results
The correlations  above do not control for other  factors nor for mechanisms  that mnight  affect
both ERRs and policies. 10 In order to account for other possible determinants  of investment  productivity  and to
explore the relative importance  of policies,  a set of multivariate  econometric  specifications  was estimated.  1 1
6  Sector-specific  disaggregation  was possible for  the larger public sector data set; the smaller private sector data set,
mostly comprising  agricultural and industrial projects,  was not disaggregated.
7 Such as the relationship between  both the real interest rate and price of tradeable goods on the one hand, and the ERR of
projects  in non-tradeables,  on the other.
8 Note that these reestimated  ERRs are not a true ex post rate of retum: the stream  of project benefits  is only flowing  for a
few years by the time of the reestimated calculation. We conducted  an analysis of possible measurement  biases with the
available subsample  of seventy  public projects  with true ex posi evaluations, undertaken  five-to-eight  years after project
completion. The reestimated  ERR and the ex post ERR were found to be very  highly  correlated (r  =.8), yet the average
expost ERR--I I to 12%--was  3-to-4 percentage  points below the average  reestimated ERR. Since the expost ERR is a
better approximation  of the true economic value of the project, this suggests  that, on average, a project implemented  in a
distorted  policy framework  will have a true  ERR lower  than 10 percent.
9 The  types of policy variable  combinations  was circumscribed  to those where indices measured different types of
distortions--thus,  for instance, indices of trade openness  and of distortions in the price of tradables are not introduced
simultaneously,  and neither is the fiscal  deficit and the real interest  rate.
10 Nor, of course,  do they control  for reverse causation;  but it seems quite unlikely that project  returns would affect  policy
distortions.- 6 -
According  to standard evaluation  methodology  at the World Bank and the IFC, any project  with an ERR below -
5% is assigned  a value of -5%. About 13 percent of all observations  in this data set have ERRs in this range.
With such censoring,  Tobit estimation  is required  to generate  consistent  results.
A. Specifications  with single policy  variables.
We tested ten specifications: a pair for each of the five policy variables.  The first
specification in each pair controls for country-  and project-specific  inputs  that could reasonably affect project
performance:  the national level of education  (measured  by average  years), terms of trade changes (to account  for
external shocks)  and the degree of institutional  complexity  of the project  (a dummy  variable for subsectors
regarded  by evaluation  units as more  complex,  including  integrated  rural projects). 12 The second  specification  in
each pair adds two other  possible determinant  of project performance:  the economy-wide  capitalllabor  ratio
(expected  to be negatively  associated  with ERRs) and the average  rate of GDP growth during  the three years
prior to project  completion  (to control for overall  economy-wide  dynamism). Since policies may affect capital
intensity and overall GDP growth of an economy,  the estimated  policy  coefficients  in these specifications
indicate the direct impact  of policies on ERRs, net of the indirect  impact  through capital intensity  and GDP
growth.  1 3
The results are presented  in table 2.14 They suggest  that policies are critical determinants  of
project  performance  even when  controlling  for these other  variables:  relatively large changes in single policy
indices are associated  with statistically  significant  differences  in ERRs of 3-to-7 percentage  points. The
interpretation  of the coefficients  on each of the indices are as follows. Lowering  the black market  premia from
120  percent to 20 percent increases the average ERR by over 5 percentage  points  15;  moving  from a very
11  Since  the hypothesis  that  the structural  parameters  of the ERR  of public  and private  projects  are  the same  could  not be
rejected,  the  data set was  pooled.
12 See  appendix  2 for  a detailed  description  of these  series.
13  When  policies  affect  both  the  capital/labor  ratio  and  GDP  growth,  the estimates  on policy  variables  will  tend  to  be
overestimated  in  the first  of  each  pair of specifications  in  table 3 and  underestimated  in  the second.  More  precisely,  let the
set of equations  for  determining  ERRs  be:
ERR  =  P,  + 6*X, + a*Z,  +&
Z,= rP,+  u
where  P = policy  variables,  X = exogenous  country-  and  project-specific  inputs,  and  Z = capital/labor  ratio  and  GDP
growth.  The  estimate  of the direct  impact  of policies  (O)  will  be overestimated  when  Z is omitted;  the direct  and  indirect
impact  of policies  when  Z is included  is P+a*y.
14Unless  otherwise  noted,  all continuous  independent  variables  in  these  and subsequent  specifications  are three-year
averages,  including  the ERR evaluation  year  and  the two  previous  years. Altemative  specifications  with  evaluation  year
data do not  alter  the results.
15 Two  econometric  notes. First,  the parallel  rate  premia  variable  in all specifications  is linear  up to  a premia  of 500
percent.  To  prevent  outliers  from  driving  the results,  higher  values  are equated  to 500  percent  plus a logarithmic
transformation  of  the difference  between  the real  value  and 500  percent.  Equally  robust  results  were  estimated  from
altemative  specifications  with  different  transformations  of  the black  market  premia,  including:  (i) any  value  above  200
percent  equaled  to 200  percent;  (ii) truncating  sample  for  values  higher  than  200  percent;  and  (iii)  any  value  above  500Table 2. Econometric  analysis of ERRs: Single policy variable Tobit specifications
Independent  Parallel rate premia  Trade  openness  Fiscal deficit  Distortions  in tradable  Real interest rate dummy
variables  prices
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Intercept  19.7  33.0  10.8  24.9  16.9  31.8  -207.0  -158.4  15.3  26.6
Policy variable  -0.055  -0.049  2.53  2.18  -0.33  -0.34  -2.26  -1.93  2.48  1.30
(6.1)***  (5.1)***  (2.8)***  (2.4)**  (2.7)***  (2.9)***  (4.0)***  (3.3)***  (2.1)**  (1.1)
Capital/labor  - -2.04  - -2.07  - -2.37  - -2.29  - -1.88
ratio (log)  (3.0)***  (2.7)***  (3.4)***  (3.4)***  (2.6)***
Years  of  -0.30  -0.18  -0.03  0.43  0.28  0.80  -0.66  -0.09  0.00  0.48
education  (1.0)  (0.6)  (0.1)  (1.3)  (0.9)  (2.4)**  (2.1)**  (0.3)  (0. )  (1.4)
Project  -2.74  -3.16  -3.50  -3.80  -3.43  -3.68  -3.54  -3.93  -3.82  -3.90
complexity  (2.0)**  (2 3)**  (2.6)***  (2.8)***  (2.5)***  (2.7)***  (2.6)***  (2.9)***  (2.8)***  (2.8)***
Terms  of trade  0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.02  0.1  0.08  0.04  0.01
improvement  (0.2)  (0.1)  (0.0)  (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.2)  (1.3)  (1.0)  (0.5)  (0.  1)
GDP growth  - 0.34  - 0.49  - 0.64  - 0.29  - 0.69
(1.6)  (2.3)**  (3.1)***  (1.4)  (34)***
Log  likelihood  -2526  -2519  -2534  -2526  -2540  -2528  -2522  -2515  -2541  -2532
No.  of  656  656  656  656  656  656  656  656  656  656
observations  _  L
Notes: Dependent  variable is reestimated  economic  rate of return (ERR) for public and private projects
Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics
Significance  levels: ***  = 99 percent;  ** =  95 percent;  * =90 percent.
a/  Each pair of columns  includes  a different  policy  variable, as indicated.
Sources: Authors'calculations.-8  -
restrictive  trade regime (1) to a fairly open one (4) increases  the average ERR by about 7 percentage  points.  A
difference  in the fiscal deficit (as a share of GDP) of eight percentage  points--for  example,  between  2 and 10
percent of GDP--yields  an ERR difference  of almost 3 percentage  points.  A large difference  in the index of
distortion  of tradable yields a difference  in ERRs of about 3 percentage  points. A dummy  variable for a positive
vs. negative  real interest rate yields a difference  of 1.3-2.4 percentage  points in ERRs (significant  in only the
first specification  of the pair).
As expected,  policies distortions  are not the only factors that significantly  affect the
productivity  of projects. Across specifications,  both the capital/labor  intensity  and the degree of complexity  of
the project significantly  affect ERRs in the expected  direction,  while the terms of trade changes variable does not
have a substantial  impact. 16
B.  Specifications  with multiple policy  variables.
If different  economic  policies have an independent  contribution  to investment  productivity,  the
overall impact  of policy  distortions  would  have been underestimated  in these single-policy  specifications. We
thus introduce  a number  of policy variables  simultaneously  into a multivariate specification;  this can also suggest
which policy  indices dominate  in their impact  on ERRs.
These results are presented in table 3. With the exception  of the real interest rate dummy,
policy  indices do have a significant  independent  (and possibly additive)  effect. For example, in estimations
including  the capital/labor  ratio and GDP growth as independent  variables,  a one hundred  percentage  point
reduction  in the black market  premia coupled  with a relatively  substantial  opening  up in the trade regime (e.g.,
from 1 to 3 or from 2 to 4) can be translated  into an improvement  in ERRs of 9 percentage  points,  holding  other
factors constant. These estimated  magnitudes  are not altered  when country  fixed effects are included  in the
specification  (column  2). The combination  of fiscal deficit and trade variables (columns  3 and 4) also suggest
significant  and independent  effects, although  the implied  effects of the changes in the policy  parameters are not
as large  a combined  impact on ERRs of about 5-6 percentage  points for substantial  policy  changes is indicated
by this combination.  17
16 Nor does average years of education  of the labor force,  measured by the World Development  Report  1991 data (see
appendix  2) or by the total years of education  series developed  by Barro and Lee (1993). But a sample selection  bias may
be at play, since Bank/lFC projects in countries  with lower  skill levels  may tend to compensate  by allocating additional
World  Bank staff and extemal consultants  in sectoral analysis (World Bank 1995) and in project design and supervision.
17 Specifications  including  country  fixed  effects  are estimated only  where policy  indices vary from year to year, which is
the case with the black market premia, the trade openness  variables, and the fiscal deficit  variable but not with the
distortion in the price of tradables (one observation  per country). Other specifications  were estimated as well to test
whether  year-effects  or structural breaks between time periods were apparent (not presented here). Year dummies, as well
as segmenting  the sample according to different time periods were tried. No significant difference  in the behavior  of the
policy variables was apparent.- 9 -
Table 3. Econometric  analysis of ERRs: combined  policy variable Tobit specifications
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Black market  (1) and country  Fiscal deficit  Fiscal deficit
premia, trade  fixed  effects  and distortion  and trade
openness,  and  in tradables  openness
interest rate
Independent variables
Intercept  30.2  67.7 a/  -134.2  27.9
Black market premia  -0.046  -0.038  - -
(4 9)***  (2.1)**
Trade openness  2.09  2.34  1.7
(2.3)**  (1.9)*  (1.9)*
Real interest rate dumrny  -0.41  -1.46  -
(0.3)  (0.9)
Distortion  in tradables  -1.71  -
(2.9)***
Fiscal deficit  - - -0.22  -0.32
(1.8)*  (2.7)***
Capital/labor  ratio (log)  -2.09  -5.11  -2.46  -2.28
i=_______________  (1I6)(2.9)***  1.6  (3.6)***  (3.3)***
Years of education  0.07  -0.75  0.10  0.66
(0.2)  (0.4)  (0.3)  (I  9)*
hnstitutional  complexity  -3.1  -2.82  -3.79  -3.6
i2=3_ l  (2.4)  **  (2.8)***  (2.6)***
Terms of trade improvement  0.02  -0.01  0.06  -0.04
.2)  (0.2)  (0.7)  (0.5)
GDP growth  0.16  0.02  0.29  0.45
_________  _  (0.8)  (0.1)  (1.4)  (2.1)**
Country fixed  effects  No  Yes***  No  No
Log  likelihood  -2514  -2481  -2514  -2523
Number of observations  656  656  656  656
Notes: Dependent  variable is reestimated  economic  rate of return (ERR) for public and
private  projects.
Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.
Significance levels:  *** = 99 percent; ** = 95 percent;  * = 90 percent.
a/  Intercept  maintained by omitting  one country  dummy.
Source: Authors' calculations.
C.  The relative importance of policy distortions
While the magnitude of the impact of distortions on the efficiency of investments is very large,
a substantial  share of the variation  in ERRs cannot be attributed  to pricing policy  factors. Even  after
incorporating  a number  of policy variables  in the analysis,  much of the variability in ERRs remains  unexplained:
without  country  dummies,  the adjusted  R-squares in ordinary least squares specifications  equivalent  to these
Tobit specifications  do not exceed 15 percent. 18
18  The  adjusted  R-squared  increases  to 0.65  when  country  dummies  are included.-10-
Both the relative importance  of policies and also their explanatory  limits are suggested by the
figures in table 4. Under a relatively  good  policy environment  (as measured  by a single  policy variable), the
probability  of a 'flop' project--with  a negative  ERR--is about one-third  that under a more distorted  regime. As
measured  by two policy  variables (fiscal  deficit and trade openness),  this probability  is about one-eighth  that
under a more distorted  regime. By contrast,  the probability  of a 'very  successful'  project--ERR  greater than 20
percent--can  be between  one-and-a-half  and twice as high  under a relatively  undistorted  environment,  as
measured  by single or multiple  variables. Yet, even under a relatively  undistorted  policy  regime, there is still a
20 to 30 percent probability  that the project  will not be 'satisfactory'.
These figures  suggest  that economic  policies are important. They  also raise an important
question:  why is it that a significant  fraction  of projects  do not become  highly successful--or  even satisfactory--
in the face of an enabling  policy  environment?  First, not all aspects  of an economy's  policy  framework  can be
captured  by any set of variables. In addition,  many other economy-wide  factors determine  project  performance.
Supportive  public  investments  matter (as discussed  in section  below); so does the quality  of governancel 9--
including  the legal and regulatory  framework. And of course,  project-specific  inputs are critical, including
technical  analysis, project  management,  and--in  many sectors--beneficiary  participation. 20 Finally, failure of
some projects--and  by extension  of some  firms--is part and parcel of decision  making  under risk and uncertainty
and thus of the dynamism  of any economy.  Risk-taking  in undistorted  economies  will unavoidably  also result in
some failures, but in many more successes  as well. 21
19 An ongoing  study  (Isham,  Kaufinann  and  Pritchett  1995)  under  the World  Bank's  review  of aid effectiveness  is testing
the significance  of selected  aspects  of govemance  on project  performance.
20  See  the recent  set  of OED  Annual  Reviews  (e.g.,  World  Bank 1  994a)  for  detailed  analyses  on  other  determinants  of
project  performance,  and  Isham,  Narayan,  and  Pritchett  (1995)  for  an analysis  of the effect  of  beneficiary  participation  on
performance  of rural  water  projects.
21  This  point  is lost  in the growing  "industry"  of project  evaluative  reports in intemational  organizations,  where each
failed  project is often regarded  as an isolated,  unambiguously  negative occurrence  (to be avoided  in the future). In these
reports,  no thought is given to the question of risk-taking under uncertainty  and interlinked  decisions. In fact, the right
strategy  can result in a number of successful  projects  for each failure, so that the "optimal" failure rate is higher than zero.-11-
Table 4.  Policies and the probability  of project success/failure
Probability  of  Probability  of  Probability  of  Probability  of
'flop' project a/  'unsatisfactory'  'satisfactory'  'very successful'
project  project  project
Pr(ERR < 0)  Pr(ERR < 10)  Pr(ERR > 10)  Pr(ERR > 20)
Policy  Variable
I. Black market  premia
When premia  < 30%  7.3%  28.1%  71.9%  29.9%
When premia > 30%  18.5%  45.4%  54.6%  16.2%
II. Fiscal deficit
Low deficit (<  4%  4.9%  24.1%  75.9%  31.6%
GDP)
High  deficit (>  4%  13.3%  36.0%  64.0%  21.6%
GDP)
III. Trade openness
Few restrictions  4.0%  21.2%  78.8%  30.3%
(index >= 3)
Substantial  restrictions  13.0%  36.4%  63.6%  20.9%
index >= 3)
IV.  Combined  policy
distortions: fiscal deficit
and trade openness
Low deficit and few  1.9%  22.6%  77.4%  35.9%
restrictions  I
High deficit and  16.3%  41.6%  58.4%  17.7%
substantial restrictions  I
Notes:  a/  Each cell figure represents  the share of 'flop'  projects in all projects that were implemented
under a given regime. For example,  the first cell indicates  that in regimes  with low black
market  premia, 6.8 percent of implemented  projects are 'flops'.
b/  Includes  'flops' as well as projects  whose ERRs were positive  but did not exceed 10
percent. The three columns  are neither  mutually exclusive  nor all-inclusive.
Source: Authors'  calculations.
D.  Changes  in policy  can make a difference
This analysis has indicated  that the quality  of the policy  framework  can make a large difference
for project  productivity. But this does not necessarily  imply  that a major policy  overhaul  will immediately  yield-12-
a vastly improved  average ERR. Given  the nature of project  selection and implementation--and  the cost and
time of restructuring  investments--many  benefits  of policy  reform may not be apparent in the very short term.
Yet the data suggest  that within a few years, significant  payoffs to policy  improvements  are
possible. Table 5 illustrates  that, on average,  countries which  move from an inappropriate  to an adequate policy
environment  are more likely to end up with much higher ERRs than countries in which policies do not improve.
Projects  that began preparation  when policies  were distorted--premia  greater than 30 percent--but  completed  the
investment  phase when the black market  premia  was very low, have an average ERR of 17.8 percent.
Table 5. The impact of changes in the policy regime on ERRs
Black market  premia at  project  completion  b  _
Black market  premia  High premia at project  Low premia  at project  All projects
before project start a/  completion  completion
(> 30%)  (<= 30%)
High initial  premia  11.7  17.8  14.1
( > 30%)  l  _
Low initial  premia  13.2  17.7  17.7
(<= 30%)  _  __  _  = 
All projects  12.3  17.7  16.4
Notes: Average reestimated  ERRs from public and private  sector projects  in each cell.
a/ Initial black market  premia  (three-year average)  at the year of project appraisal. Appraisal
takes place toward  the end of the project  preparation  process,  usually about a year before
implementation  begins.
b/  Three-year  average of black market  premia  preceding  time of project  completion.
Source: Authors' calculations.
By contrast,  this evidence  indicates  that countries  in which the policy  framework  deteriorates
will experience  a substantial  drop in investment  productivity. Projects  that began preparation  when policies
were not distorted--premia  less than 30 percent--but  completed  when  the black market  premia  was higher have
an average ERR of only 13.2 percent.
Of course,  this relationship  between  the black market  exchange  rate premia and ERRs cannot
capture the variety and complexity  of policy  reform  measures  that are required  to improve  investment
productivity. The black market  premia index is a proxy of many distortions;  the exchange  rate regime  is one of
many policy  components  in an economy. Macroeconomic  stability, an appropriate  interest rate, relatively  open
external and domestic  trade regimes,  and credibility  in the reform  program are equally important  preconditions
for an appropriate  incentive  structure. Nevertheless,  the figures  in table 5 suggest  that policy  makers have room
for optimism  when embarking  on economic  reforms. When policies improve,  high payoffs are expected;  but
deterioration  in the policy  framework  can be very costly.-13-
To test econometrically  the impact  of policy improvement  during project  implementation,  we
modified  the basic multivariate  analysis to control  for initial conditions  of the black market  premia (table 6).
Selected  specifications  which control for fixed  country  effects confirm  the statistical  robustness  of the
relationship  between  policies and ERRs, controlling  for initial  policy  conditions:  economic  reforms within a
country seem  to yield payoffs within a few years.
Table 6. ERRs and policy reforms: controlling for initial conditions
Not controlling  for initial  policy  Black market  premia change
conditions  during  project implementation
Intercept  87.5  82.4
Black market  premia at  -0.046
project  evaluation  (2.5)**
Black market  premia  at  -0.031
project appraisal  (1.0)
Premia change since  -0.047
project appraisal  (2.5)**
Capital/labor  ratio  -6.8  -6.2
(1.8)*  (1.6)
Education  years  -1.6  -1.7
(0.9)  (1.0)
Project  complexity  -2.8  -2.7
(2.0)**  (2.0)*
Terms of trade change  0.02  0.02
(0.2)  (0.2)
GDP growth  0.06  0.07
(0.2)  (0.5)
Country  fixed effects  Yes***  Yes***
Log likelihood  -2368  -2369
No. of observations  624  624
Notes:  Dependent  variable is reestimated  economic  rate of return (ERR) for public and private
projects  (with black  market prenia data available  at project appraisal and evaluation).
The intercept  was not suppressed  in these specifications;  a country  dummy  was omitted.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Significance  levels: *** = 99 percent; ** = 95 percent;  * = 90 percent.
Source: Authors' calculations.
V.  The Effect of the Overall Public Investments  Program  on Individual  Proiect Productivity
In the developing  world, governments  have been responsible  for the provision  of basic
infrastructure  services--in  transport,  energy, and agriculture  (World Bank 1994b). 22 Such  public investments
22  The econornic  justification for such public investments  are familiar. These services enjoy a substantial  public good
component,  and their production and provision  are often subject to extemalities and/or large economies  of scale.  Thus,  the
private sector  will be less likely  to provide  them or may do so in less than optimal quantities.-14-
may enhance the productivity  of individual  projects in the tradable sectors  by reducing  operating  costs,
increasing  demand  for their products, and diminishing  downside  risks; where these services are absent, the
economic  efficiency  costs can be large. 23 Yet as the public sector extends  itself into lower priority areas (where
the public  good component  is nonexistent  and/or the private sector can provide  these services more effectively),
productivity  for individual  investments  may not be enhanced. Maintaining  an appropriate  balance between  the
shares of public  and private  investments  in total investment  is also important. Public investments  in certain
priority areas are complementary  to the efficiency  of individual  investments;  in other areas, they may supplant
private investments.
A. Basic statistical  results
Data for agricultural  and industrial  projects demonstrate  the importance  of overall public
investments  for investment  productivity  in the tradable sectors. The productivity  of private and public tradable
projects increases significantly  as the share of public investments  in GDP grows--but only up to a point. Figure
1  depicts simple range averages  from the raw data 24: the average ERR for investment  projects increases by
about 5 percentage  points as the share of overall  public investment  in GDP increases from 5 to almost 10
percent. However,  as the share of overall public  investment  increases beyond  the 10 percent public
investmentlGDP  ratio, the average ERR eventually  drops.
23  See  Lee  and  Anas  (1990)  for  documentation  of the costs  of under-provision  of public  infrastructure  services  on
manufacturing  enterprises  in Nigeria.
24 For figures  I and  2, the points  represent  ERR  averages  for  each  segment.-15-
Figure 1: Share of public investment in GDP and the productivity of tradeable projects
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The data plotted in figure  1 suggests  that the relationship  between overall public investment  and the productivity
of tradable  projects is particularly  strong for projects implemented in a relatively undistorted policy framework.
The ERR of projects implemented under an undistorted environment is on average about  13 percent in countries
where the share of public investment in GDP is 5 percent or less, while the ERR exceeds  19 percent when public
investment in GDP is on average 9.5 percent.  But as the share of public investment exceeds  10 percent,
investment productivity declines--to  an average ERR of about  15 percent.25
These data also demonstrate the importance of maintaining an appropriate balance between public and private
investment shares (figure 2).  In economies with undistorted policies, the average ERR of tradable  projects
increases from  14 to 20 percent as the share of public investment rises to about 40 percent.  Yet increasing the
share of public investments above this range substantially reduces project productivity.
25 This (average)  turning point should not be interpreted,  however,  as a precise benchmark for  policy in each country
setting; they only suggest that complementary  public investments  do not increase  the ERR of tradable projects  after a
certain point.-16-
Figure 2: Share of public  investment  in total  investment  and the productivity  of tradeable
projects
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B. Econometric  Results.
To test the significance  of these basic statistical  relationships,  we conducted  restricted Tobit
analysis--with  spline functions  (Green 1990)--for  the public  investmentlGDP  ratio and the public
investment/total  investments  ratio. The results (table 7) indicate  the statistical  significance  of the relationships
depicted in figures 1 and 2.
The overall  public investmert  program of a country  appears  to affect strongly  the productivity
of individual  projects,  especially  in settings  where the economic  policy environment  is relatively  undistorted.
When the policy  environment  is distorted,  the ERR of tradable projects  will be low  regardless of the relative size
or shares  of the public investment  program  (colunmns  2 and 6).  By contrast,  in an improved  economic  policy
environment,  increasing  the size of public  investment  up to about 9.5% of GDP has a statistically significant
positive  effect; but increasing  the size further  has a significant  negative effect (columns  3 and 4).  Likewise,
increasing  the share of public  investments  in total investment  up to about 40%, has a statistically  significant
positive  effect; but increasing  the share further  has a significant  negative effect (columns  7 and 8).-17-
Table 7. Public investments  and the ERR of tradable projects
Public investment/GDP  Public investment/total  investment
All  Low premia  All  Low premia  High
premia
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Intercept  4.6  12.6  6.9  11.1  7.0  9.1  5.5  11.4  7.3
Public  1.22  0.65  1.23  1.12  0.26  0.28  0.35  0.31  -0.08 c/
investment  a/  (2.7)***  (3.1)***  (2.4)**  (2.2)**  (2.2)**  (2.4)**  (2.8)***  (2.4)**  (0.9)
High public  -1.61  -0.76  -2.06  -1.95  -0.60  -0.52  -0.69  -0.68
investment  b/  (2.3)**  (1.1)  (2.4)**  (2.3)**  (3.5)***  (3.1)***  (3.5)***  (3.5)***
Black Market  - -0.059  - - - -0.057  - -
Premia  (5.4)***  (5.2)***
Terms of trade  - 0.06  - 0.02  - 0.06  - 0.03  0.26
change  (0.5)  (0.2)  (0.6)  (0.2)  (I. 1)
Project  - -2.47  - -2.34  - -2.54  - -2.73  -0.86
complexity  (1.7)*  (1.4)  (1.7)*  (1.6)  (0.3)
Years of  - -0.09  - -0.50  - -0.09  - -0.66  1.43
Education  (0.2)  (1.2)  (0.2)  (1.5)  (1.9)**
Log likelihood  -1607  -1588  -1255  -1253  -1601  -1584  -1252  -1249  -336
Number of  422  422  321  321  422  422  321  321  101
observations  I  I
Notes:  a/ For public  investment/GDP,  the segment  up to 9.5%  of GDP;  for  public  investrnent/total  investment,  the
segment  up to 40%  of total  investment.
b/ For  public  investment/GDP,  the segment  exceeding  9.5%  of GDP;  for  public  investment/total  investment,
the segment  exceeding  40%  of  total  investment.
c/ This  specification  (in column  9) is linear,  not  kinked,  since  there  were  no significant  breaks  in  the relationship
between  public  investment  and ERRs  in  regimes  with  high  black  market  premia  sample.
Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.
Significance  levels: ***  = 99 percent;  ** = 95  percent;  * = 90 percent.
Source:  Authors'  calculations.
These results suggest  two powerful  aspects of policy  reform.  The best public investment
"balance" cannot compensate  for poor macroeconomic,  trade and pricing  policies. In addition,  undistorted
policies are necessary  for high  productivity  of projects in the tradeable sectors,  but in themselves  they may not
always  be sufficient:  they need to be complemented  by appropriate  public investments.  In a sense, the quality of
the public investment program can be regarded as another policy variable--one that is subject to significant
distortions.  As such, a good policy environment requires more than correct macro-fundamentals  and relative
pricing: it also requires an appropriate public investment  program.  26
26 Easterly  and  Rebelo  (1993),  using  aggregate  cross-country  data,  find  that  investment  in  transport  and  communication  is
consistently  correlated  with  GDP  growth.-18-
VI. Possible  omitted  variable and sample selection  bias.
This sample of projects financed  by the World Bank group may suffer  from selection  bias; it is
neither  random  nor necessarily  representative  of public  or private projects  in any given country. Consider  what
may occur in countries  where the World Bank project  presence  is not large relative  to overall investment--and
where the Bank is not a residual lender. Given its special lending  role, the World Bank in such cases may
attempt  to 'skim-and-insulate':  to identify  the best possible projects  and then try to insulate  them from national
policy and institutional  deficiencies. By contrast, in countries where the Bank project  presence is large, one
could expect that projects financed  by the World Bank Group  to have about average performance. In such cases,
insulating  projects from policy  inadequacies  would  be less feasible.
Thus,  we might expect  that the World Bank 'project  presence'  would  be inversely  related to
ERRs. Further, if project  presence  were negatively  related to the quality  of the policy framework,  the impact  of
policies on ERRs may have been overestimated  in the specifications  above. Omitted  variable bias--in an upward
direction for the estimates  of policy  effects--would  arise if settings  where the Bank can skim and-insulate  also
happen  to have better economic  policies.
A.  Econometric  specifications  with World Bank proiect presence.
To test for possible  mis-specifications  due to such omitted  variable bias 27, we constructed  a
World Bank 'project  presence'  variable:  the Bank's accumulated  project  disbursements  as a share of the total
capital stock. Using this variable (a single observation  for each country),  we tested  for mis-specification  in two
ways. First, this variable was included  as an additional  independent  variable in the primary set of Tobit
estimations  (table 8, column 1). Second,  the project  presence  variable was also used to truncate the sample  for
low and high values of World Bank presence. After removing  the outliers, we tested whether the policy
coefficients  behaved  differently  for the remaining  sample, where  the Bank presence  was within a more 'normal'
range. In all cases (specifications  2-4, for left-, right- and double-tail  truncations,  respectively),  the robustness
of the policy  coefficients  was maintained. 28
27  Instrumental  variable  estimation  was  also  considered  to test for  mis-specifications.  In this  case,  however,  the challenge
of finding  an appropriate  instrument--correlated  with  policy  variables  but not  with  the error  term  of the 'second  stage'
regression (ERR  i8  =p*  + a*Xi + a * Z  +  g)--seems  insurmountable.  Possible  candidates,  including  variables
on economic conditions  and govemance,  for example,  must be ruled out because  of the likelihood of endogeneity.
28  In specifications  including  the other main policy variables  utilized in our analysis,  the results--not  reported here--are
also very similar.-19-
Table 8. Selection bias test using World Bank project presence
Bank presence  as  Truncating  data if  Truncating  data if  Truncating  data if
independent  Bank presence  Bank presence  Bank presence
variable  <=0.05  >0.12  <=0.05, > 0.12
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Intercept  47.5  34.2  34.6  37.3
Parallel  rate  -0.045  -0.053  -0.049  -0.056
premia  (4.8)***  (3.9)***  (6.1)***  (4.3)***
World Bank  -80.55  -
project presence  (3 9)***
Capital/labor  -3.20  -2.34  -2.18  -2.65
ratio (log)  (4.3)***  (2.5)**  (3.1)***  (2.6)**
Years  of  0.26  0.33  0.15  0.30
education  (0.8)  (0.9)  (0.5)  (0.8)
Project  -3.35  -4.09  -2.71  -3.42
complexity  (2.5)**  (2.3)**  (1.9)*  (1.8)*
Terms of trade  0.04  -0.02  -0.01  0.01
improvement  (0.5)  (0.2)  (0. 1)  (0.1)
GDP growth  0.25  0.30  0.30  0.23
(1.2)  (I.0)  (1.4)  (0.8)
Log likelihood  -2512  -1495  -2432  -1409
No.  of  656  395  631  370
observations  ___
Notes:  Dependent  variable is reestimated  economic  rate of return (ERR) for public and private
projects
Numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics
Significance  levels: ***  = 99 percent; *  =  95 percent;  * = 90 percent.
Source: Authors' calculations.
B. Econometric  specifications  with truncated  samples.
We carried out a second  statistical  technique  to test for possible biases arising  from the Bank's
project  selection  process. Most  projects in this data set, in addition to receiving  reestimated  ERRs, received
expected  rates of return (AERR) before project  implementation.  Projects with high  AERRs indicate  investments
where World Bank and borrower country  staff anticipated,  to some degree, a 'skimming'  within the country;
projects  with low AERR's, by contrast, indicate  an anticipated  role as lender  of last resort.
We truncated  the project  sample to exclude  outlier observations:  those with very low  AERRs or
with very high  AERRs. We found (table 9) that the relationship  between  policies and reestimated  ERRs was not
found  to be statistically  different  in the truncated  samples. This suggests  that 'skimming'  in some countries and
'lending-as-a-last-resort'  in others do not bias the policy  parameters. 29
29  We  owe  this  suggestion  to Eduardo  Engel.-20-
Table 9. Selection bias test using appraisal economic rates of return
Sample  trunca ion  based upon apprai  sal economic  rates of return  (AERR)
No truncation  Left truncation:  Right  truncation:  Double  truncation:
AERR < 15%  AERR > 40%  AERR <15% and
>40%
Intercept  33.5  35.0  27.0  27.8
Black market  -0.049  -0.056  -0.050  -0.059
premia  (5.0)***  (4.6)***  (6.2***  5.8)***
Capital/labor  ratio  -2.09  -2.05  -1.29  -1.13
(3.0)***  (2.4)**  (2.2)**  (1.6)
Education  years  0.18  0.03  0.07  -0.10
(0.5)  (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.3)
Project complexity  -3.20  -3.39  -3.62  -4.05
(2.3)**  (2.0)**  (3.1)***  (2.9)***
Terms of trade  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.05
change  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.3)  (0.5)
GDP growth  0.35  0.54  0.20  0.33
(1.6)  (2.0)**  (I.1)  _  (16)
Log likelihood  -2461  -1933  -2175  -1666
No. of  640a'  495  597  452
observations
Notes: Dependent  variable is reestimated  economic  rate of return (ERR) for public  and private  projects.
a! 640 projects with  recorded  expected  rates of return.
t-statistics  are in parentheses.
***:  99% confidence  level
**:  95% confidence  level
*:  90% confidence  level
Source: Authors'  calculations.
VI Exploring  the 'black box': the link between  economic  policies and investment  productivity
These statistical  results on the importance  of policy-related  factors for investment
productivity  appear quite robust. What mechanics  account  for this strong  association  between the policy
environment  and project performance?  This paper is a first attempt  at investigating  the empirical  relationship
between  policies and project-level  productivity;  a definitive answer  of the complex  linkages  within the "black
box" cannot be expected  here.  (Appendix  3 includes  three case studies  which  illustrate how public and private
projects  can be adversely  affected by a distorted  policy  environment.) In this section,  we propose four channels
through  which the linkage  between country-wide  policies and microeconomic  productivity  may be established 30.
A.  Channels  between  country-wide  distortions  and microeconomic  productivity
30  In addition,  see appendix  4 for a simple  model  of the relationship  between  project  rates of return and economic
policy  distortions.-21-
Ex post evaluations of unsuccessful projects (including the case studies in appendix 3) illustrate
how a distorted policy environment can reduce project benefits by delaying and reducing project output.  In each
case, distorted incentives and weak public investments directly affect project output: even if the correct shadow
prices had been used in the ex ante evaluation of project performance, the standard methodology would not
capture this likelihood of under-production  under policy distortions. 31 Thus, while the standard  shadow price
adjustments are akin to Y-efficiency corrections--i.e.,  accounting for movement along the production
possibilities frontier (PPF)--these reductions of output are similar to X-efficiency  considerations--i.e.,  movement
within  the PPF.32
In addition, the choice of outputs is more likely to be incorrect when significant distortions  are
present.  For an agriculture project, for example, inappropriate  signals and/or lack of effective demand would
make it likely that the wrong trunk road is selected for construction; a solid policy framework,  with appropriate
agricultural  incentives, would promote the selection of  a rural feeder road that meets market demand and is
economically productive.  This problem is compounded in economies where administrative  controls in the
distribution of inputs are prevalent.
More indirect channels may also be at work.  Overvalued exchange rates and unsustainable
fiscal deficits lead to two inevitable consequences which are damaging to the return on investment: the 'boom-to-
bust' cycle during fiscal expansion and foreign-exchange  rationing.  The cycles lead to periodic under-utilization
of capacity, reducing the measured return to capital, while rationing of foreign exchange reduces access to
necessary imported inputs. 33
Further, even in settings with undistorted policies, ERRs can be very different where basic
public investments are lacking, or conversely where  the public sector is overextended.  Certain projects,
particularly  agricultural and industry projects, depend on a minimum amount of public infrastructure  (e.g., trunk
and feeder roads, port facilities,  and telecommunications).  By contrast,  with too much public investment--as  in
31 We thank numerous seminar  participants  for exploring this point. There is extensive  literature  and experience on
methodologies  to account for  deviations of key prices from their equilibrium  values (exchange  and interest rate, trade taxes,
formal  wages) which can be applied rigorously  and directly  to the calculation  of net present values and ERRs (Little and
Mirrlees 1991). Yet the statistical  findings in this paper suggest  that the importance  of accounting for  the impact of the
policy framework  on the stream of net costs and benefits  through capacity  underutilization  have historically  been
underemphasized.
32 This hypothesis  is supported by a comparison  of reestimatedfinancial rates of return (FRR) of private projects  under
different  policy regimes.  For example, in our sample,  the average FRR under a high fiscal deficit  is 8.4 percent,  compared
to 14.5  percent under a low fiscal deficit. The differences  in FRRs under different  policy regimes are similar to those in
ERRs. These results suggest that it is movernent  along the quantity  dimension--not  adjustments  of real or shadow prices--
which mainly lower  rates of return under a distorted  policy environment.
33 We thank Dani Rodrik for this insight.-22-
the illustrative  case of Jamaican sugar processing--the  private sector can be crowded  out and the productivity  of
marginal  public investments  can be very low indeed.
Further research  is needed  to explore  the complex  mechanisms  whereby  the quality of
economy-wide  policies affect  project performance. From  this work, we offer a classification  of these
mechanisms,  much of which get translated  into capacity  underutilization. 34 Poor  economic  policies adversely
affect investments  at three crucial stages: i) during  project identification  and preparation,  through  the wrong
choice of output  and scale--and of types of inputs and capital, including  import and capital/labor  intensities;  ii)
during  project implementation,  through access and costs of inputs  and capital investments;  and iii) during the
project's operational  life, through lower-than-anticipated  demand  for output as well as constrained  access and
higher costs of working  capital and foreign  exchange  for inputs.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have established  a statistical  association  between  a country's  policy
environment  and investment  project performance. All types of projects--in  the tradable and non-tradable  sectors,
with  public and private financing--are  adversely  affected  by distortions  in the macroeconomic,  trade, and pricing
regimes. Improvements  in the policy  framework  result in improved  productivity. Performance  of projects in the
tradeable sectors  is related to the size of public investment. While there are many other factors explaining
project success  or failure,  the quality of overall  economic  policies is found to be important  and statistically very
robust. An difference  of 10 percent points in ERRs of projects implemented  in undistorted  economic  policy
regimes is not uncommon.
Under  sensible assumptions  regarding incremental  capital/output  ratios, such differences  in
ERRs--if  economy-wide--can  be translated into a 2-to-3 percentage  point increase in national income  growth--
year after year. Standard  neoclassical  theory predicts a one-time  increase in GDP level when  certain policies
change (e.g., trade openness)  but no change  in the growth rate; this empirical  linkage between  economic  policies
and investment  productivity  suggests a mechanism  through  which  policies affect the growth rate of economies,
not merely  a one-time adjustment  of levels. 35
The significantly  lower productivity  of investments  under distorted  policy  environments  raises a
critical strategic question:  should any resources  for project  preparation  and implementation  be expended  in such
countries? Three  different  justifications are often advanced  for project preparation  in countries  where the policy
framework  is inadequate  at present--and  is unlikely  to improve  in the very near future.
34 See Kaufmann and Wang 1995  for a detailed  discussion of the mechanisms linking economic  policies  and the
productivity  of investments  in the social sectors.
35 See Isham, Kaufmann and Pritchett (1995) for a growth accounting exercise that supports the use of the ERR as
an indicator of the economy-wide rate of return.-23-
In large countries  where the Bank presence  is relatively  small, it can be argued that
significantly  better-than-average  projects can be identified  and implemented. Our analysis does suggests  that the
average ERR is likely to be higher in these countries. But it also shows that poor policies lower ERRs even in
'skimmable'  countries: the ex posl ERR in a similar  country  with good policies  would be expected  to be
significantly  higher. The advisability  of lending  funds to 'distorted-yet-skimmable'  settings  is weakened  further
if the overall  lending program--including  structural  adjustment  loans--can  be used effectively  as leverage for
improvements  in the policy  framework (Isham  and Kaufmann 1992).
Lending  for poverty  alleviation and for the social sectors  has a clear sociaVequity  rationale that
transcends efficiency  considerations:  this could  justify project lending  even in distorted  policy  environments. It
is important,  however,  to assess the likelihood  of project  success under such an approach. The benefits  to the
target group may be diminished  by the overall  policy distortions. Implementing  social  projects may still be
justified as long as the benefit,  to the poorer segment  of the population  can be verified. Conceptually,  this is
equivalent  to attaching poverty/distributional  weights in project appraisal (Squire and van der Tak 1975). It is
then important  to make explicit the kind  of distributional  weights  the government  and financing  agencies are
willing to attach to these programs. The results in Kaufmann  and Wang (1995) are not very encouraging:  the
probability  of success of social projects is much lower where distortions  are present. Hence, the distributional
weights  may have to be particularly  lopsided  to  justify social  sector intervention  in countries mismanaging  their
economies.
Finally,  one can argue that investments  of longer  gestation--in  infrastructure,  for example--
could be initiated  under a poor policy  framework. The implicit  assumption  is that by the time  the investment  is
operational,  the policy  framework  would  be likely to have improved  and thus the benefits would  be forthcoming.
There are three interrelated  risks in this strategy. First, there may be a high  probability that the policy
framework  may not be significantly  improved  in the future, rendering  the project unproductive. Second,  the
choice of the particular infrastructure  project is more likely to be an incorrect  one when significant  distortions
are present. Third, the implementation  of a long gestation  investment  project is likely  to be hampered by an
inadequate  policy  environment,  particularly  when the country  is in fiscal crisis, and/or administrative  controls in
the distribution  of inputs are prevalent.
Thus, the pitfalls in these  justifications  for lending  under a distorted  policy  environment,
coupled  with the empirical  findings  of this paper, suggest  that an improved  (or at least improving)  policy
framework  should be a critical  precondition  for a significant  program of lending  assistance for project
investments. In fact, the results reported  here do suggest  that committing  to such program of lending assistance
being conditional  on sound overall economic  policies makes sense for lenders and recipients  alike. The case for
selectivity  in country-choice  is lent support by the strong  association  between  economic  policies and investment
project  performance  found  in our research. Yet our findings  also suggest  room for hope: donor financing  for-24-
improvements  in the policy climate is likely to pay off. A powerful  rationale for supporting  structural  reforms is
that they raise the productivity  of investments--public  and private.-25-
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Appendix  table 1. Economic policies and the economic rate of return  (ERR) of projects:
Combined  policy distortions
Average ERR (%)
All projects  All public  Public  Public  non-  Private
projects  agriculture  tradable
sectors





and real interest rate
Highly  distorted  9.7  10.0  5.6  14.2  6.3
Somewhat  15.7  16.1  16.7  15.8  12.6
distorted
Non-distorted  19.5  19.7  14.2  25.0  insf
2. Fiscal deficit and
price distortion  index
of tradable  goods
Highly  distorted  14.8  15.0  15.3  15.8  insf
Somewhat  16.2  16.2  14.7  17.4  15.1
distorted
Non-distorted  17.7  18.0  18.4  18.6  15.0
3. Fiscal deficit and
trade restrictions
Highly  distorted  8.7  9.1  6.9  12.7  insf
Somewhat  15.0  15.3  15.2  15.7  11.1
distorted
Non-distorted  20.0  20.8  15.0  28.1  insf
Notes  Average reestimated  economic  rate of return of public  and private projects,
classified  by multiple  policy  distortions.
'Highly  distorted'  categories  include  all observations  with high distortions  for each
of the single policy indices;  'non-distorted'  include all observations  with low
distortions  for each of the single  policy indices;  'somewhat  distorted'  include all
remaining  observations  with non-missing  observations  for each of the single policy
indices.
'Insf  denotes  insufficient  number  of observations  (less than 10)  to make
inferences.
Source: Authors'calculations.Appendix  1: Summary  Statistics
Appendix Table 1.  Summary stat stics
N  Mean  Standard  Miinimum  Maximum  Number  of  Years
_______  _  Deviation  countries
Dependent variable
Reestimated  ERR  1625  15.9  15.1  -20  155  61  1974-1990
Police verfomance  data
Black  market  premiaa  1516  45.6  87.2  -7.8  508.2  60  1974-1990
Fiscal  defecit  820  -5.30  4.99  -25.28  8.40  35  1974-1990
Index of trade restrictiveness  531  1.66  0.86  1  5  36  1974-1987
Index of pricing distortions  1254  100.27  1.20  96.19  102.2  58  1974-1985c
Real interest rate_  778  -1.96  15.25  -92.03  87.8  33  1974-1988
Standard indet)endent variables
Capital/labor  ratio (log)  856  8.24  1.01  5.71  10.74  55  1974-1987
Education  years of working  age  856  4.39  2.08  0.39  11.22  55  1974-1987
Dunimy  for project  complexity  1486  0.21  0.41  0  1  61  1974-1987
Change  in terms of trade  1242  -0.97  7.27  -24.24  54.18  61  1974-1987
GDP growth  1282  3.69  3.32  -16.61  21.96  57  1974-1987
Additrional indevendent variablesI
Public investment/GDP (%)  1235  42..3  16.3  7.4  93.2  60  1974-1988
Public investment/total  1243  9.3  4.4  0.9  34.5  60  1974-1988
investment (%)  I  I
Black  market  premia at project  1577  22.3  14.5  1.0  161.0  60  1961-1983
approval  I  I_I
World Bank presence  1332  0.066  0.040  0.001  0.233  56  1974-1987'
Notes: See appendix 1 for data descriptions  and sources. a) See footnote 14 in text for description  of truncation  of  black  market
premia. b) Real interest rate  dummy  ( =  1 if real interest rate > 0) used in analysis. c) One observation  per county  for time  period.
Source: Authors' calculations-29-
Appendix 2:  Data Sources
Descriptions  of all data used in this analysis are listed in the following  subsections. Unless
otherwise  noted, the data source  is "World  Development  Report 1991: Supplementary  Data;" which includes
more  detailed descriptions  and original sources. This data may be obtained  free of charge through the office  of
the World Development  Report at the World Bank.
A. Policy and investment variables
Parallel  or black market  premia:  the yearly mark-up  of the parallel market  rate for foreign exchange  over the
official  exchange  rate. Calculated  as BLACK  =  [(BMER-OER)/OER ]*100 where BMER is
the black market  exchange  rate and OER is the official  end of period exchange  rate. Source:
BLACK in "World  Development  Report 1991: Supplementary  Data."
Index of trade restrictiveness:  based on specific  policy  criteria such as tariffs and non-tariff  barriers. Index
scaled  from (1) to least restrictive (5).  Source:  HALTHOM  1.
Fiscal deficit of the central government  as a share of GDP: derived  directly from tables in country  reports  from
the IMF. Source:  International  Monetary  Fund.
Index of pricing distortions  in tradable goods:  weighted average of mean  price distortion  in the period 1973-85
and of its standard deviation. Source:  DOLLAR4
Real interest rate: inflation  (change  in the CPI over the same  year) subtracted  from the nominal interest rate
(according  to availability  in order of preference  among T-bill rate, money  market rate, lending
rate deposit  rate, discount  rate).  Source:  REAL4.
Public investment/GDP:  ratio of public sector investment  to GDP. Source: INVPUB4,  PUB_GDP.
Public  investment/total  investment:  ratio of public sector investment  to total private and public sector investment.
Source: INVPUB4,  INVFPR4, PUB_GDP,  PRI_GDP.
B. Structural and Dynamic Variables:
National level of education:  estimated  average years of education  of the population  of working  age group (15 to
64). Based on UNESCO data on enrollment  rates for the period 1960-88  and on mortality and
birth statistics. Source:  EDT4
Terms of trade chanzes: calculated  from exports at current prices/exports  at constant  prices divided  by imports  at
current prices/imports  at constant  (1980) prices.  Source:  TOT4
Institutional  complexity:  a dummy  variable for subsectors  regarded  by evaluation  units as more  complex,
including  integrated  rural projects. Source: Authors' calculations,  based upon sectoral
information  provided  by the Operations  Evaluations  Department,  World Bank.-30-
Capital/labor  ratio: estimates  of the capital stock  for were constructed  by using estimates  of constant  dollar
investment  figures  from standard  World Bank sources; annual estimates  of the labor force were
interpolated  from standard World Bank data. Source: K02, LABOR4.
GDP growth: calculated  from GDP at constant 1980  prices, U.S. dollars. Source: GDPKD.
World Bank Project Presence:  calculated  as the World Bank's accumulated  project  disbursements  as a share of
the total capital stock. Source:  World Bank data, K02.
C Rates ofReturn
Economic  Rates of Return: Ratio of discounted  stream of benefits  to discounted  stream of costs,  evaluated at
shadow/border  prices. Public and private  projects. Source: Operations Evaluation
Department;  International  Financial  Corporation. (OED will review specific  requests for the
use of its data on a case-by-case  basis. The private  data is not publicly  provided  in order to
protect  the confidentiality  of IFC's private clients).-31-
ApDendix  3: Three case studies
The three case studies  below (chosen from many illuminating  cases shared by World Bank
and IFC staff) illustrate  how policy  distortions  and inappropriate  incentives  can quash project  productivity--and
how an enabling  environment  can lead to increased  productivity.
In 1973,  the Jamaican government  launched  a integrated  development  program to promote
agricultural  development  and improve  farmer well-being. It included  two projects financed  by external aid:
construction  of rural infrastructure  and rehabilitation  of the main (publicly  owned)  sugar refining factories. An
overvalued  exchange  rate and a restrictive  trade regime  during most of the 1970s--including import and price
controls as well as licensing  and marketing  restrictions--led  to critical shortages  in imported  inputs. Only a
fraction of the planned feeder  roads were completed  because  of shortage  of trucks and spare parts; the design  and
execution  of a water supply  system  was delayed because  of a lack of equipment (compounded  by the absence of
qualified  project  personnel). Private investment  in the sugar industry  was crowded  out by growing  public
ownership  and operation  of the sugarcane  industry. Supply  of sugarcane  declined  due to ineffective  public
cooperatives  and mandated  low  producer  prices. Production  of sugar halved: the efficiency  of the sugar
processing  factories  deteriorated  because  of equipment  shortages  as well as lack of maintenance  and poor
management.
Private sector projects  will also tend to be inefficient  when market incentives  are inappropriate,
and when complementary  investments  and institutions  are absent. During the late 1970s, a multi-million  dollar
investment  in a private  meat production  company in an African country 36 was designed  to process cattle for
export and local consumption.  The firm planned  to purchase 40,000 head of cattle per year and export 80
percent of production.  Export  demand  did not materialize  because of an overvalued  currency. The firm's
potential  revenues  were further lowered by the introduction  of export taxes. Domestic  sales were subject to
newly introduced  price controls--although  the firm paid market-clearing  prices for non-regulated  inputs. The
firm tried to circumvent  wholesale  price restrictions  by setting up its own retail shops, but the required licenses
were never granted. Inappropriate  incentives  were compounded  by inadequate  public services: the parastatal
electricity  company  was unable to meet production  requirements.  The firm purchased  a standby  generator, but it
was unable to purchase enough  diesel fuel due to the very limited administrative  allocation of foreign exchange.
Purchases  of cattle for processing  never reached 10 percent of capacity, and the firm made steady losses until it
closed in the early 1980s.
By contrast,  a competitive  domestic  environment  in Chile allowed  Tomas G6mez to thrive. As
a small entrepreneur  in the late 1970s,  he produced  leather shoes in two rooms  in Santiago. At the time, internal
36  At the request  of  the furnisher  of this  case  study,  the country  and  firm  name  must  remain  anonymous.-32-
competition  in the industiy  was fierce, so he had to concentrate  on efficient  production  and domestic  marketing;
the overvalued  exchange  rate and the high tariffs on competing  imports  discouraged  the export of shoes.
Following  the external trade liberalization  of the early 1980s, potential  importers  who visited his shop were
impressed  by his quality  and cost. Mr. Gomez  secured  orders and devoted  20 percent of his shoe production  to
exports--newly  labeled  "Di Mario" . He grew rapidly and efficiently,  fulfilling  increasingly  larger export orders.
By 1991  he exported 80 percent of his production  at $2.5 million  equivalent  per year, almost one-tenth  of overall
Chilean exports of shoes. And he employed  350 workers in a large and modem  factory. 37
37 Industry and economywide  studies of the Chilean economy  mirror  G6mez'  experience (Liu 1993). Following  the
adaptation  of far-reaching  macroeconomic  and trade reforms,  the average productivity  of manufacturing  finns increased  as
inefficient  firms exited,  more efficient  firms  entered, and surviving firms increased  their productivity.-33-
Appendix  4: Theoretical  model
Using a simplified version of the standard cost-benefit formula, we derive a basic model to show how the
internal rate of return of a project may depend on the policy environment.
Let the net present value (NPV) of a project be defined as:
(I)  NPV=Z(BC  ?)tIo,
where  (B-C), = gross benefits - recurrent costs = net benefits
r  =  discount rate;
1  initial  capital investment.




(3) rb>  ';rC  <  0;r, <  0.
Assume that the quality of economic policies can be indexed in a meaningful fashion (Rodrik  1994) and
that gross benefits,  recurrent  costs, and the initial  capital investment  are affected  by policies through  a set of
specific  channels  (see  section VI) such that:
(4) Bp>°;  Cp<0;1,<°,
where  p = policy index (higher  values  associated  with better policies).
Using (3) and (4) to totally  differentiate  (2) yields:
(5) rp  > 0.
Thus, this simple  model  predicts  that project  returns  are positively  associated  with  better economic
policies--as  captured  by the policy  index.-34-
Appendix  5:  Countries
All countries with at least one project used in this analysis are listed below, sorted by World
Bank country codes.  The first set of countries was used for all tables with average ERRs (table  1, 2, 5, and 6)
and figures I and 2.  The second set was used for all the regression models (tables 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and  10).
I)  Countries used in summary tables and fizures:
1.  ARG  Argentina
2.  BDI  Burundi
3.  BEN  Benin
4.  BGD  Bangladesh
5.  BOL  Bolivia
6.  BRA  Brazil
7.  CAF  Central African Republic
8.  CHL  Chile
9.  CIV  C6te d'lvoire
10.  CMR  Cameroon
11.  COL  Colombia
12.  CRI  Costa Rica
13.  DZA  Algeria
14.  EGY  Egypt
15.  ETH  Ethiopia
16.  GAB  Gabon
17.  GHA  Ghana
18.  GTM  Guatemala
19.  GUY  Guyana
20.  HTI  Haiti
21.  HVO  Burkina Faso
22.  IDN  Indonesia
23.  IND  India
24.  ISR  Israel
25.  JAM  Jamaica
26.  KEN  Kenya
27.  KOR  South Korea
28.  LKA  Sri Lanka
29.  LSO  Lesotho
30.  MAR  Morocco
31.  MDG  Madagascar
32.  MEX  Mexico
33.  MLI  Mali
34.  MRT  Mauritania
35.  MUS  Mauritius
36.  MWI  Malawi
37.  MYS  Malaysia
38.  NGA  Nigeria
39.  NIC  Nicaragua
40.  NPL  Nepal
41.  PAK  Pakistan
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